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Preface
l
This report has its origin in an interest on the part of the Chr. Michelsen
Institute to explore new fields of research. A proposal was submitted to the
research staff meeting in December 1993, suggesting four such areas for
research. The proposal, entitled "States under Dual Pressures - From Above
and Below: Widening or Narrowing the Scope for State Action" was written in
response to suggestions from the Board of the Institute to consider new fields
of research, particularly with reference to the emergent research programme
Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the State (ARENA). The
decision was made to do a study on social identities. The report was written in
summer - early autumn L 994 and was submitted to the Board and the Research
Director of the Institute. As the contents may be of interest to ongoing research
at the Institute and elsewhere, the authors and others at the Institute thought it a
good idea to make the report more accessible by having it published in the
Report series. Only llnor changes have been made from the previous report.
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Board of Den
Norske Bank Anniversar Fund for the Chr. Michelsen Institute for the
generous grant received which allowed the authors the time needed to do the
report and relevant literature to be purehased. Tor Halvorsen is gratefully
acknowledged for comments and suggestions along the way.
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1 Introduction
Our main argument in what follows is that changes in social identities wil have
to be analysed in close relation to social movements. We argue that in order to
make social identities more tangible and thus more appropriate for analysis, it
should be studied in relation to the organisational outlet for such identities, in
movements, associations, networks and other kinds of collective ventures. Our
point of deparure is that social movements are a genuinely modern
phenomenon that are inextricably linked to the general process of
modernisation in Europe. We do therefore start by examining some central
features of modernity as they are observed in the literature. As modernity
matures, the social basis for association changes accordingly. New types of
social movements appear advocating other issues than previous movements.
Political paricipation may seek these modes of expression rather than the
formalised, institutionalised world of parties and interest organisations. The
paper tries to outline how these social changes are reflected in the theoretical
literature on social movements. Theoretical differences in approach in the US
and in Europe are described, corresponding to different intellectual traditions as
well as different historical experiences on the two continents. The Resource
Mobilsation (RM) approach and the New Social Movements (NSM) approach
are current theories that by and large correspond to US and European traditions
and experiences, intellectually as well as historically.
Two features characterising the European approach are first, the emphasis
put on identity and culture and secondly, on civil society. We devote
considerable discussion to the elucidation of these concepts as we wil argue
that they give important pointers toward the research agenda we would like to
pursue.
An important consideration is the extent to which social movements resp ond
to the different and changing social environments within Europe and outside
and secondly, between West and East Europe. A look at what may be changing
bases of identity may give an idea about what kinds of movements are
emerging or may emerge in the future. Religious, ethnic, regional and national
identies may not only be expressed in various types of movements, these
movements may even under certain circumstances claim self-determination.
We try to explore some of these trends by using the concepts of categorical and
relational identities.
On the basis of the discussion of theories and approaches, we conclude by
proposing some promising areas of research and we hope that the following
review may provide the researcher with some of the necessar tools with which
to make further explorations. We would sugge st three. First,. more research is
needed on the concept and reality of citizenship in multicultural societies;
sec ond, more inclusive theories of social movements are needed to correct for
some of the current biases and thereby to embrace the full range of social
4 CMI-report
movements in the current world, and thirdly, more research is needed on how
identities come about and what controls they may be subjected to.
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2 Theories of modernity
The task of analyzing proeesses of change as complex as those we currently
face in Europe calls for theoretical approaches of corresponding complexity. In
our opinion, an analytical framework based on theories of modernity may offer
the required complexity. Questions concerning the nature and consequences of
modernity were essential to sociology already at its very creation, and the
relationship between social science and modern society has since then remained
so close that the history of sociology may be read as a reflection of the history
of modernity. In order to properly deal with theories of modernity it is useful to
keep in mind that both the theories and the societies should be understood in
their proper historical context.
Late European nineteenth century society stil behaved largely in accordance
with the classical Enlightenment principles of modernity, and the early
sociologists all based their analyses on these principles of rationality,
objectivity, secularisation, and progress. Their concrete perceptions of the
consequences of modernity varied significantly, however. EmIle Durkheim, for
instance, had high and distinetly optimistic hopes for the modern era, which he,
due to its large capacity for adaptation and development, saw as a superior form
of social organisation. Max Weber was more pessimistic about the
consequences of modernity, which he predicted would be dominated by
inhuman large-scale bureaucracies; he did, however, agree with Durkh~im that
the modern mode of organisation due to its capacity for ordered adaption and
change is superior to others. Karl Marx deviated from his two colleagues in
that he did not see the modern society of his time as an end in itself, but merely
as a means to reach a post-capitalist - but hardly post-modern - socialist society.
Thus, the influence of the Enlightenment ideas is evident in all these
sociologists' theories - as well as in their methodological approaches, which are
characterised by orderly , systematie, and basically one-dimensional and
uni-directional analyses of the contemporar modern societies.
When turning to the contemporar scene of theories of modernity, it is clear
that the classical Enlightenment perception of modernity has lost much of its
momentum. The tendency of contemporar society to be perceived as
increasingly chaotic and irrational rather than ordered and rational - some of the
current changes in Europe ilustrate this tendency fairly well - must take much
of the blame for the decline of the popularity of the Enlightenment ideas
(Mestrovic, 1994). They do, however, stil have prominent defenders, of whom
Ernest Gellner is one. In his recent work he reconfirmed his strong and
long-standing conviction that modern society is indeed orderly and rational,
and that the social world is comprehensible to any researcher wiling to accept
rationality and objectivity as the imperative principles for scientific .activity
(Gellner 1992).
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Gellner and his like-minded are representatives of the vast and diverse field
called modern social science, which is a paradigm founded on the assumption
that cumulation of objective, scientific knowledge about the social world is
indeed possible (Rosenau 1992: 169). This paradigm is bein g rejected by an
increasing number of social scientists, among whom the post-modernists
constitute alimited, but significant group. Taking as a point of departure the
assumption that the social world is by nature "fragmented, disrupted,
disordered and interrpted" (ibid.: 170), and thus inclined to rapid and irrational
changes, postmodernist social scientists avoid Gellner and others' problem of
explaining how apparently chaotic and uncontrollable social processes can be
expressions of an orderly , systematic, and rational social world. The
postmodernists' problem is a rather different one, though closely related.to their
world view and its consequences for social scientific activity: Their
deconstructivist approach, which implies rejection of the principles of modern
science down to its perceptions of linear time and predictable space, logically
leads to a rejection of the very concept of knowledge (ibid.: 171-172). While
proficient at drawing intriguingly fragmented pictures of contemporary society,
postmodernist social science therefore has in itself a rather limited abilty to
contribute to the body of autonomous social scientific work - a fact that a
number of the adherents of this tradition recognizes when claiming that their
only possible objective is indeed limited to criticism and deconstruction of the
alleged findings of modern social science.
Eager defenders of the classical Enlightenment ideas like Ernest Gellner and
equally eager offenders of the very notion of social scientific knowledge like
the postmodernists are best understood in terms of being the "extremists" of
contemporary social science, and their theories should be read as
fundamentalist acceptances or rejections of the Enlightenment heritage.
However, a third approach can be found, emphasizing that modernity combines
features of both order and chaos.
As a non-postmodernist relativist, Antony Giddens has developed a theory
of modernity which represents a quite different - and, we believe, in our .context
more constructive - interpretation of contemporary modern society than those
so far discussed. He argues that even though modernity is based on the
classical Enlightenment belief in human reason and rationality, the irrationality
and chaos that currently appears to dominate our world should be understood as
inherent consequences of modernity rather than as expressions of the post
modern - he calls the period they signify late modernity. This period has,
according to Giddens, taken on quite a different appearance than the early
modern period of Durkheim and Weber; it is characterised by much greater
complexity and impenetrabilty. Put differently, contemporar modernity is
multi-dimensional on the leve! of institutions, and each of the single
dimensions focused on by the early sociologists (industrialism by Durkheim,
rationalisation by Weber, capitalism by Marx) plays a part in this late modern
totality of dimensions (Giddens 1990: 12).
Giddens uses a discontinuist institutIonal approach to modern society - he
assumes that modern institutions are distinct from all types of traditional order,
and that it is through studies of the uniqueness of these institutions that one
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may grasp what modernity and its consequences actually are. Some
preconditions are, according to Giddens, fundamental for the existence of
modern social institutions. One of these is the separation of time and space,
which makes possible the "empty" modern perception of time as independent
from what happens during it (ibid.:18). Such an "emptying of time" is a
precondition for the "emptying of space", meaning the separation of the
concept of space from the ide a of place in the meaning of a locale, and both
these "emptying" operations are necessar parts of the modern condition.
Hence, while a pre-modern time-concept like "sunset" wil be linked to both
season and place, "seven o'clock" is an abstract expression of time which
permits planning and ordering of events over indefinite distances. Thus, this
separation permits the time-space "zoning" of social life which is a
precondition for the modern mode of social organisation.
Closely connected to the time-space separation is the disembedding of social
systems, which lifts social relations out of local contexts of interaction and
restructures them across indefinite spans of time-space (ibid.:21). There are
several disembedding mechanisms. One of them is symbolic tokens, 'such as
money, which makes possible interchange independently of the actual
individuals or groups involved at any time. At least equally important are,
however, what Giddens names the expert systems, which are systems of
technical accomplishment or professional expertise organising a main part of
the late modern social environment (ibid.:26).
According to Giddens, the modern separation of time and space and
disembedding of social systems have as consequences a mode of social
organisation where the individual to a large extent is unable to control the
preconditions for his or her own way of life. The large degree of generalised
trust in the social system which this lack of individual control implies, is what
enables modern society to develop in so complex ways. However, the back
side of this coin, namely the high leve! of generalised risk involved in such a
social form, is by many perceived as an even more central characteristic of late
modernity (see for instanee Beck:1993), and this is what makes modernity an
unusually vulnerable form of social organisation, since the high level of
complexity results in a situation where large-scale breakdown is a higWy
probable outcome if individual trust in the system is withdrawn.
While vulnerabilty is modern social organisation's weak spot, its gre at
capacity for change is its main advantage. Giddens actually identifies dynamic
change as modernity's most central characteristic, along with its globalising
nature. The latter comes about because of the "stretching" of relations between
local and distant events which is a consequence of the time-space distanciation
that may well be seen as an integrated part of the general dynamic nature of
modernity.
However, this inherent dynamism of the modern mode of social organisation
has accelerated the pace and scope of change as modern society has matured,
and it is this acceleration of change which has lead to the increasing number of
unintended consequences of modernity which today tend to appear to us as
irrational chaos. Thus, the current state of disilusionment with rationality,
science, the future, and most other things which many social scientists today
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choose to term post modern, is actually the inherent and unavoidable
consequence of the initial Enlightenment ilusion on which modernity is built,
namely that human reason can produce certain knowledge, and thereby control
the consequences of human action. Rather than being beyond modernity, the
current state is therefore actually thoroughly modern in nature, it is "modernity
coming to understand itself" (Giddens 1990:48).
In spite of great differences, the theories of modernity so far discussed
resemble each other on one point: they all, in one way or another, recognize the
dynamic nature of their object of research. This dynamism - the possibly most
generally recognized aspect of modernity - characterises all modern
institutions, and not the least the political institutions.
The democratic form of government has come to constitute the modern
mode of political organisation par excellence, paricularly in our part of the
world. !ts relatively gre at adaptability to change, together with its emphasis on
the c1assical Enlightenment perception of individual freedom and autonomy,
probably explains much of its popularity.
Unlike most earlier forms of government - and like most other modern
institutions - democracy depends on trust from the individual members of
society in order to function. Significant parts of the current development in
Europe may be seen as indications that trust in the democratic system is
dec1ining: In the "old" European democracies, we see distrust expressed in
dec1ining participation in elections as well as in the revitalisation of
non-democratic ideologies. In Eastern Europe, where modern democracy tends
to have a rather shorter, or even non-existent, history, large sections of the
population seem indifferent or outright opposed to the (re )establishment of
democratic rule, due to the lack of trust in politics and politicians in general.
This withdrawal of trust in modem parliamentary democratic institutions may
be approached in terms of the increasing number of unintended consequences
of the late modern period. The inability of contemporar governments to
control an increasingly uncontrollable society is easily perceived by the
electorate as political incompetence and contempt for those who brought them
to power. One should, however, be careful with interpreting the withdrawal of
trust as a sign of political apathy. Contemporar political history actually
suggests the contrary: political activity in Europe is as high as ever, but it is
absorbed by other kinds of political channels than the classIcal numerical one;
in the late modern period, Europeans decreasingly trust conventional
politicians, and increasingly work politically in social movements rather than in
political parties (Dalton and Kuechler 1990).
Social movements are distinctive of modern society - in that sense, they are
thoroughly modern phenomena. Furthermore, social movements have in the
modern era developed into more advanced forms than previously known; they
have become intrinsic parts of the modern system. Their progress during the
modern era is without doubt related to their unique qualities as agents for
change. Or, in Giddens' words, "social movements provide glimpses of
possible futures and are in some part vehic1es for their realisation" (ibid.: 161).
Therefore, understanding current political changes in Europe means
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understanding contemporar European social movements. A large body of
social movement theory is available to help us with that task.
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3 Social Movements
3.1 The evolution of socIal movement theory
Interest in social movements constituted a central element of the early
sociological occupation with modern society. In spite of significant differences,
the first traditional social movement theoreticians (Rucht 1991: 24) had one
thing in common: They regarded social movements as anomalies, as caused by
grievances existing in society, and thus as pathological social phenomena. At
the turn of the century, the group psychology approach, developed by among
others Emile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud, was very influentiaL. Empirically,
it focused on expressions of collective behaviour events like mass hysteria and
"mob"-like crowds. The research was founded on the assumption that
crowd-behaviour is basically irrational, and the aim was to find means to
control or prevent such dangerous and destructive forces in society.
The Marxist approach to social movements deviated from the view
generally held by the traditional socIal movement theoreticians because it did
not perceive the existing social order as the ideal, and because it regarded a
social movement - the labour movement - as the constructive driving force in
the struggle for socialism. Due to the enormous practical political impact of
the labour movement in Europe in this century, the historical-materialist
approach exerted considerable influence on the European perception of socIal
movements. One consequence of this was that the socIal sciences to a large
extent came to regard the labour movement as the prototypical modern socIal
movement, and another consequence was that social movement activity in
Europe from the early stage was understood in terms of materialist, c1ass-based
politics and philosophy.
While Marxism tends to see socia! movements as such as both positive and
natural aspects of modern society, and is more interested in analyzing and
evaluating the different movements' messages than in explaining why they
come about, the school of Max Weber - the other significant early theoretical
tradition in the field of socIal movement research in Europe - regards them with
more .suspicion.While agreeing withMarx that the division between labour
and capital was the main conflct-line in modern society, Weber saw significant
problems related to the social movements which this conflct had brought to the
centre of society. Because he feared their destructive powers, he tended to
prefer social movements in their mature, institutionalised forms - forms which
became readily avaIlable for study as the labour movement in the interwar
period consolidated its central institutional political positions throughout
Europe. In the same way as the labour movement maintained its political
position in the postwar period, the inheritance from Marx and Weber continued
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to dominate European theoretical approaches to social movements until the late
Sixties.
In the United States, the situation was quite different. There, the socialist
movement never had any significant influence, and it was the group psychology
approach rather than Marxism that came to in spire American social science in
the first half of the century . From this source, two theoretical schools with
distinctly different focuses emerged. The symbolie interactionist school
associated with Herbert Blumer saw social movements in more positive terms
than was otherwise common, as this school, though its individual-oriented,
social-psychological approach focused on the potential social creativity in the
new forms of symbolic interaction within such movements. The structural
functionalist school, of which Talcott Parsons was a founder, drew on Emile
Durkheim and the early European group-psychology approach as well as on
Max Weber in their focus on macro-level structural strains caused by social
imbalances during the process of modernisation as reasons for the occurrence
of social movements. In spite of significant differences, these two schools later
came to merge in the collective behaviour approach, which dominated
American research on social movements untIl the late Sixties (SmeIser 1962).
Occurring more or less simultaneOlisly in Europe and the US, the so-called
new social movements of the Sixties did only marginally follow the
acknowledged patterns of the "old" social movements. The exact ways in
which they were perceived to break with the social movement tradition did,
however, vary considerably between the European and American social
scientific milieux - understandably , since their existing bodies of theory
developed on the basis of the "old" social movements were so different. In
Europe, the theoretical response to the new social movements quite simply
carries their name, whIle the theories developed in the US constitute the
Resource Mobilisation Approach.
The European New Social Movements Approach has as its point of
departure a perception of the new social movements as qualitatively very
different from the "old" movements. The differenee lies both in the values
propounded by the movements, their action forms, and their constituencies.
New social movements theory draws on traditional social movement theory
in that it focuses on grievances and aspirations caused by social modernisation
as explanations of the rise of movements. However, the new movements are
results of new kinds of grievances and aspirations, which, according to the
theory, unlike the old ones result in a focus on non-material values (or
post-material in Ingleharts (1990) terms). This occupation with non-material
issues is perceived as a fundamental element of the new social movements, and
has earned them labels like "post materialist", or even "post modern" (Eyerman
and Jamison 1991).
The action-forms of the new social movements are also interpreted as signs
of their qualitative newness. Their small-scale, de-centralised, un-hierarchical
st yle reflects their conscious distantiation from the political establishment, but
is also related to the fact that such action forms suit the typically one-issue new
social movements (in contrast to holistic "old" movements purporting to have
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one all-embracing solution), focusing on clearly defined themes like gay rights,
anti nuc1ear power, or environmental issues.
This lack of a single master-narrative guiding the activities of the different
new social movements points toward another of their characteristics
highlighted by new social movements theory: Rather than working for
revolution or other large scale social change, the new movements aim at
producing or reconfirming paricular collective identities, and at establishing
and consolidating group culture (Rucht 1991). This concern with group
identity and culture is an indication of the high degree of self-reflexivity which,
according to new social movements theory, typifies the members of these
movements, who furthermore tend to originate from quite different
constituencies than the members of the "old" movements: New social
movements recruit from the new middle classes, and from groups more than
normally exposed to the negative consequences of modernisation. These
constituencies' main motivation for joining is, according to the theory,
satisfaction of endangered (non-material) needs, which is sought through
compensation for loss or disturbanee of identity.
The American Resource Mobilisation Approach regards the new social
movements from quite a different angle. It is similar to the traditional social
movement theory in that it focuses on collective action as the significant
expression of social movements, but unlike this theoretical school - and also
unlike the new social movements approach - it finds grievances to be
insufficient conditions for collective action, since grievances wil exist in all
socIeties. Instead, the approach emphasises avaIlabilty of resources and
opportunities as the essential preconditions for collective action. Thus,
compared to the earlier discussed approaches to analyzing social movements,
resource mobilsation theory turns the question upside down, in that it focuses
on opportunities for rather than reasons for creating social movements. The
resource mobilsation approach furthermore deviates from the earlier American
theoretical tradition in that it does not perceive collective action as negative,
deviant behaviour; rather, it seeks to identify the "objective" interests of the
participants in social movements.
The rational actor is a central concept for the resource mobilisation
approach, since its understanding of paricipation in social movements buIlds
on an assumption of individual rational estimation of the costs and benefits
involved in this kind of activity. For this line of thinking, the organisation of
social movements - if, how, and to which degree they are organised - is of
central importance. Good organisation is perceived as a main resource,
supposed to both decrease the individual costs of paricipation, help
recruitment to the movement, and generally increase the chances of success in
reaching the movements aims. Moreover, the likelihood that the movement
wil succeed, following the principles of rational choice, wil be an imperative
collective incentive for participation in the movement. According to Charles
Tily, one of the central figures within the resource mobilisation approach, the
analysis of collective action has five big components: interest, organisation,
mobilisation, opportunity, and collective action itself (Tily 1978:7). These
components sugge st the overall organisational focus of the approach, and the
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degree to which it differs from the identity- and culture-focused European new
social movements approach in its understanding of their common objects of
research: the new social movements.
While the resource mobilisation approach analyzes rather well the
mobilisation-phase of social movements, it is less useful when it comes to
explaining "irrational" collective behaviour like suicidal projects in the name of
a movement or participation in high-risk movements generally . As a tool for
analyzing emerging social movements in contemporary Europe, it has several
weaknesses. Firstly, some of the movements which have made themselves
most notable lately, like nationalist, fascist, and sectarian movements, can only
with difficulty be understood in terms of rationally ca1culating individual
actors. In fact, the RM approach does not theoretically and methodologically
differentate strongly between routinized political activity and the sort of
non-routinized political activity normally associated with social movements.
Turning to new social movements theory, the geographical c10seness of this
approach to the object of research cannot hide the fact that its emphasis on the
qualitative "newness" of contemporary movements in our connection makes it
an awkward tool. Social movements which are "new" in the approach's sense
constitute only a limited part of the total range of current social movements. A
fair share of this totality appears to be. "neo-old" if anything, since the
movements may be said to revive ideas of holism, nationalism, and, to an
extent, materialism, and as they tend to recruit from the constituencies of the
"old" social movements rather than from those of the new. Thus, the new
social movements approach describes well the reflection of the late modern
social complexity and fragmentation in the ad hoc-type, one-issue directedness
of the new social movements. It does, however, seem unable to deal
constructively with the recently occurring movements which do not follow the
pattern of the new social movements.
The problems of the new social movements approach may be related to the
great emphasis it places on the qualitative differences between "new" and "old"
movements. It has lately been claimed by others (see for instance Calhoun
1993c) that this division is not only exaggerated, but actually analytically false.
According to this line of argument, the "new" aspects of the new social
movements are due mainly to their quantitative, not qualitative, newness, and
these "new" aspects could also be found in "old" social movements, when they
were at a simIlar stage of development. In any case, the new social movements
approach seems to be rather severely handicapped when it comes to dealing
with social movements on a more generallevel, and may therefore be only of
limited use for us.
3.2 Recent contributions to socIal movement theory
When measured against the analytical needs of a study of proeesses of social
transformation in contemporary Europe, the theoretical approaches discussed
so far se em to have in common a simplistic and one-sided way of perceiving
their object of study, whether their emphasis is on social grievances, rational
actors or post-materialist identities. Seen from a different angle, this may
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suggest that the current late modern European social form - unlike previous
social forms - is characterised by a lack of one overarching empirical tendency.
Put differently, what may be typical for contemporary European social
movements is exactly their lack of a typical character - and, perhaps, their sheer
multitude, since social movements flourish like never before in Europe.
This late modern multiplicity of social movements calls for theories of a
new level of complexity; it requires theories which simultaneously can explain
militant neo-nazi groups and animal rights movements. However, the new
social movements- and resource mobilisation approaches have continued to
dominate the research done on social movements until now (see for instance
Morris&Mueller 1992), and the current empirical situation is most often
attempted fitted into these somewhat one-sided theoretical frameworks.
Some attempts at filing this theoretical void through developing a "third
generation" theoretical synthesis have noentheless been made. Most of them
seem to have in common a preference for the European new social movements
approach rather than the American resource mobilsation tradition as a source
of inspiration, a preference made c1ear not the least by their commonly large
emphasis on the concept of identity. Apart from that, they approach the theme
rather differently . We wil examine two of them here.
3.2.1 The cognitive approach
With what they call a cognitive approach to social movements (Eyerman &
Jamison 1991), Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison attempt to straighten out
what they seee as a biased relationship between the social sciences and social
movements. WhIle most sociological approaches to social movements do
"perhaps unwittingly serve to bring them under political control" (ibid.:2), their
cognitive approach seeks to avoid this disloyalty to the objects of rese.arch by
studying the movements on their own terms. They are entirely clear about the
reason for their concern: As former American student activists they identify
with the new social movements trend, and therefore find it natural to study
social movements in terms of positive contributions to society rather than as
undesired liabilties. Hence, they distance themselves clearly from their
American group psychology and collective behaviour-inspired theoretical
heritage. As they do not focus on social grievances as sources of social
movements, they do, however, on this particular question, lean more towards
the resource mobilisation-approach than the new social movements approach.
According to Eyerman and Jamison, their choice of using a historically and
politically informed interpretation of a social theory of knowledge as basis for
their approach enables them to move beyond the biased, partial, and
insufficient ways which have dominated social science's understanding of
social movements. Furthermore, this theoretical foundation allows them to
treat movements processually, a possibilty which is central to them, since they
understand social movements basically as activities by which individuals create
new kinds of social identities. Hence, they abandon the resource mobilsation
approach's occupation with rational actors, and draw instead on the European
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tradition's focus on identity (~e)construction as a main purpose of social
movements.
With such an understanding of social movements as their points of
departure, human action obviously becomes a central issue. Eyerman and
Jamison link action to their theoretical framework through the concept of
cognitive praxis. Because it emphasises the creative role of consciousness and
cognition in both individual and collective action, they place this concept
centrally in their theory; they do, however, limit the vast empirical field it
defines substantially by identifying only the cognitive praxis that transforms
groups of individuals into social movements, and which give the movements
their particular consciousness, as their main interest.
Hence, social movements are to Eyerman and J amison (as they are to
Giddens) first and foremost carriers of new ide as and new identities. They
produce new thoughts, and also new ways of organising these thoughts socially.
The exact ways in which this is done by each movement constitute its
dimensions of cognitive praxis - the concepts, ideas and intellectual activities
which give them a cognitive identity. The movements' collective knowledge,
then, is not only the specific issues which they are created around, but also the
general world-view assumptions which are shared by the members of a
movement. The movement intellectuals - intellectuals who are "produced" by
the social movements, but who at the same time play an essential part in the
production of a movements cognitive praxis - are core actors in this process of
produetion. The central role given to these intellectuals by Eyerman and
Jamison fits the main objective of their approach, which is to study the
processes by which new ideas are formulated by movements and then adopted
by the surrounding society.
Social movements are cognitive praxises shaped both by external and
intern al political proeesses; therefore,they must be understood in relation to
their historical and social contexts. Following this line of thought, Eyerman
and Jamison makes a c1ear distinetion between what they call "modern" and
"postmodern" social movements. While the modern social movements were
results of the modern era, and therefore carried this period's holistic ideas and
materialist concerns within their cognitive praxises, the postmodern socIal
movements - which dominate the contemporar movement-arena - are
characterised by the non-materialist, particular-issue concerns of postmodern
society, according to Eyerman and Jamison, and thereby they again show new
social movements theory to be a central source of inspiration for their work.
The cQgnitive approach to socIal movements is presented as a comparative
approach, both in relation to historical periods, and in relation to political
cultures. It is interesting for us that this means by implication that the approach
is applicable to all kinds of socIal movements. Eyerman and Jamison's reading
of social movements as results of processes of interaction centering on the
articulation of a collective identity immediately appears sufficiently general to
be suitable for this implied use. Hence, if the assumptions of Eyerman and
J amison are sound, they may indeed, as they c1aim, be able to add to the
knowledge about both the process of ariculating a movement identity
(cognitive praxis), about the actors taking par in this proeess, (movement
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intellectuals), and about the contexts of articulation (political cultures and
institutions) (ibid.:4).
However, several aspects of the cognitive approach to social movements
give reason to be somewhat cautious about applying it to a study of proeesses
of social transformation in contemporary Europe. Concentrating on its
advantages first, its main contribution when seen in relation to the new social
movements approach - by which it c1early is strongly inspired - seems to be the
shift in focus from seeing social movements as products of social wrongs to
seeing them as natural parts of (post)modern society, whose presence do not
have to be justified. As we remember, this was also Marx' attitude, and thus
hardlyanew one; nevertheless, it is refreshing in new social movements
theory-inspired contexts. Secondly, the approach's occupation with social
movements as agents for knowledge produetion rather than as social
phenomena in themselves is interesting. By this shift in focus, they turn social
movements into means of study rather than into aims of study, and thereby they
seem to free them from some of the empirical specificity which restricts the
scope of the new social movement approach so much.
The question stil remains, however, of whether this freeing of the object of
research from empirical specificity has taken place to a sufficient degree. The
legacy of new social movements theory is still very present in Eyerman and
Jamison's work. Their analytical approach may probably be applied in studies
of most kinds of social movements. However, the fact remains that it is best
suited for studies of "nice", progressive social movements of the kind that
Eyerman and Jamison identify with; their focus on social movement
contributions, and their emphasis on the role of social movement intellectuals,
do sugge st that this is the case.
Hence, it is not clear to which extent the cognitive approach to social
movements is generally applicable. Eyerman and Jamison definitely think that
it is, but there is reason to believe that even though they explicitly c1aim not to
state "that all social movements 'are "progressive""(ibid.:4), and thus implicitly
c1aim that their approach may cover all kinds of social movements, they have
developed a theory which suits "progressive" movements primarily. This is
ilustrated by their chosen example of the American civIl rights movement and
more recently, in their extensive study of the American student movement of
the Sixties.
Their colleague Klaus Eder is perhaps less self-deceiving when stating that
"not every form of protest is a social movement. Fascist movemepts, for
example, are forms of collective mobilzation, but they are not social
movements. They may indirectly contribute to the modernization of society;
but this is not their explicit goal - on the contrary. Social movements are those
directly and intentionally related to modernization from the seventeenth century
on" (Eder 1993: 107). At least he is c1earer about his way of understanding
social movements. The divèrgence between the definitions of social
movements of Eyerman and Jallson on the one hand and Eder on the other, as
well as the former's apparent problems with relating to their own formal
definition in practice, may be seen as consequences of the general and
longstanding problem within social movements research of not having a
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commonly agreed upon definition, or even understanding, of the nature of the
object of research. This problem has been underlying throughout this
presentation of social movement theory, and emphasises the need to be c1ear
about the use of concepts when dealing with social movements. Indeed it may
appear that the term social movement itself is intimately linked to the idea of
social progress and advaneement and to the general modernisation of society.
As we shall see, some of these assumptions also colour the work of Cohen and
Arato.
3.2.2 Social movements and civil society
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato see it as their main task in their voluminous
Civil Society and Political Theory (1992) to revive the concept of civil society
and to make it applicable for analysis of contemporary society. Their objectives
are partly a renewal or a refocusing of political theory and partly establishing
the parameters for a paricular political programme. The latter objective can be
seen from their statement that "what we have in mind, above all, is a
self-understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in favor of radical
reform that is not necessarIly and primarily oriented to the state. We shall
define as "self-limiting radicalism" projects for the defense and
democratization of civil society that accept structural differentiation and
acknowledge the integrity of political and economic systems" (493). Their
"working definition" of civil society understands it as "a sphere of social
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate
sphere (especially the famIly), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication" (ix), the
latter linked to the presence of a public sphere. More specifically, civil society
consists of the following components: "(1) Plurality: famIlies, informal groups,
and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy allow for a variety of
forms of life; (2) Publicity: institutions of culture and communication; (3)
Privacy: a domain of individual self-development and moral choice; and (4)
Legality: structures of general laws and basic rights needed to demarcate
plurality, privacy, and publicity from at least the state and tendentially, the
economy" (346).
In brief, "civil society refers to the structures of socialization, association, and
organized forms of communication of the lifeworld to the extent that these are
institutionalized or are in the process of being institutionalized" (x). These
structures are guaranteed and protected by legal rights that fend off intrusions
from the state, in particular.
Their concept of civil society and their political programme take it for
granted that in contemporary society radicalIsm does not any longer mean the
total overthrow and dissolution of the economic and political systems. The
notion of the functional differentiation of society into economy and state as
separate sub-systems with a high degree of autonomy is in their opinion beyond
dispute. Opposed to these functional systems is the notion of a life-world, a
concept rooted in the phenomenogical tradition of sociology, associated with
Schutz and Luckmann and ulitimately derived from HusserL. This concept is
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also central to Jürgen Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981)
and is there linked to the danger of "the colonisation of the lifeworld" by the
economic and political systems, to the idea that both systems can be said to
encroach upon the lifeworld or the institutions of civIl society. Civil society can
thus be said to have a defensive role vis a vis the two systems. However, if that
were the whole story, it would be an unwarranted simplication. In addition to
civil society, Cohen and Arato introduce the concepts of economic and political
society that function as buffers or alternativelyas conveyor belts into the
economic and political systems. As already mentioned, a similar role may be
assigned to the public sphere. Their point is that it is wrong to think of civil
society purely in a defensive way as something being encroached upon; civIl
society may be thought of as the source of excursions into political and
economic society and also as the source for a vital public sphere. It would be a
more fruitful approach to deepen and democratize the institutions of civil
society and influence the institutions of economic and political society than to
sealoff civIl society from any unwanted external intrusions.
With these definitions in mind, their objections against the predominant
approaches within social movement theory can be more easily understood.
Their objection against the collective behaviour approach is that its concept of
collective behaviour, i.e. of non-institutionalised behaviour, is seen as an
indication of the breakdown of the norms and institutions of civil society. The
approach's theoretical heritage in mass society theory (Kornhauser, Heberle)
precludes it from seeing non-institutionalised behaviour as paralleI to, and not
contrary to, institutionalised behaviour. Despite their putative adherenee to
pluralism, the approach cannot on its account examine the relation between
collective action and the modernisation of civil society. Of course, this was
also, as we have seen, the main complaint of the resource mobilsation
approach in its emphasis on the rationality of collective conflct and its
rejection of the dichotomy between the two types of behaviour.
For the resource mobilsation approach, there is no fundamental dichotomy
at all as collective action per se involves the rational pursuit of interests by
groups responding organisationally to changes in resources and to changes in
opportunities. Nonetheless, what is llssing in the approach is an exallnation
of the social preconditions that make these changes in resources and
opportunities conducive for mobilsation and organisation. The work of Charles
Tily examplifies a higher awareness of cIvil society than that of others within
the RM approach as he makes cIvIl society the terrain of collective action, but
not, as Cohen and Arato argue, the target of collective action. Tily introduces
two types of collective action, "reactive" and "pro-active" corresponding to
"defensive" or "offensive" types of mobilisation, respectively. The former
would typically involve defensive mobilisation by communal groups against
threats from the outside, whether that be state makers bent on gaining control
over the population and its resources or the national economy disregarding
local needs or interests. The latter would involve gaining controlover power
and resources where they did not previously exist, for example at the national
leve! and would imply a higher degree of organisation. Whether defensive or
offensive, collective action is se en by Tily as responses to changes in power
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relations. These responses have shifted over time from communal bases of
action toward associational bases of action and in the proeess gained in
autonomy. But, as Cohen and Arato argue, this shift in the basis of collective
action is itself not explained, only its consequences for types of collective
action. Cohen and Arato's point is of course that this shift signifies the
emergence of modern civil society as the new terrain for collective action.
What is missing from Tily's account is what they call "the politics of identity"
which seeks to describe changes in identity within cIvIl society and secondly,
the tendency of Tily to conflate what they call "the politics of inclusion" with
power. Both these faults are due to Tily's penchant for conceiving of collective
action in state - society terms, as defenses against state encroachment or
attempts at state conquest.
Their alternative thesis is that in contemporary social movements, a dualistie
politics of identity and influence operates, aimed at both civIl and political
society. Whereas contemporary movements combine both defensive and
offensive types as per Tily's terminology, a new feature is that they no longer
protect preexisting traditions from outside interference, but instead create
spaces for the creation of new identities and solidarities. In brief, "autonomous,
voluntar, and indigenous associations within civil society using and expanding
public discourse and public spaces for discourse are the differentia specifica of
contemporary social movements" (507). The RM approach is not so much
wrong as it is one-sided and monistic due to its insistence on the criterion of
success as being to bring an exc1uded (or challenging) group into the polit Y .
Accordingly, the programme is as follows: "It is therefore incumbent on the
theorist to view civil society as the target as well as the terrain of collective
action, to look into the proeesses by which collective actors create the identities
and solidarities they defend, to assess the relations between socIa! adversaries
and the stakes of their conflcts, to analyze the politics of influence exercised
by actors in civil society on those in political society, and to analyze the
structural and cultural developments that contribute to the heightened
self-reflection of actors" (509).
The emphasis given to "the politics of identity" puts Cohen and Arató within
the orbit of the concerns of the new social movements approach which as they
observe, focus primarily .on issues of social norms and collective identity.
However, they are as aware of the opposite pitfall to that of the RM approach:
obsessive focus on inc1usion into the polit Y is but a mirror image of the politics
of identity if it implies a "retreat to autonomy", abandonment of outward
struggle for the inner retreat of communal, sectarian life. This pure identity
model is akin to "the status of powerless consumers of change by withdrawing
into countercultures or refusing innovations that theaten existing privileges or
the cultural integrity of groups" (513). Resistance to change is but a
mirror-image of adaptations to it. Indeed, what is required is a dualistie social
theory that takes as its point of departure the dual face and dual organisational
logic of contemporary social movements. That theory accepts, as we have noted
above, the system-lifeworld distinetion in order to account for both the
defensive and offensive aspects of comtemporar movements. The elements
would inc1ude the politics of identity, relating to cultural norms, individual and
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collective identities and social roles; the politics of inclusion, targeting political
institutions to gain recognition for new members of political society and to
achieve benefits therefrom; the politics of influence, altering the terms of
political discourse to make ro om for new need-interpretations, new identities
and new norms; and finally, the politics of reform, aiming at the
democratisation of political society (participative democracy) and economic
society (industrial democracy). As they argue, "while the democratisation of
civil society and the defense of its autonomy from economic and administrative
"colonisation" can be seen as the goal of the new movements, the creation of
"sensors" within political and economic institutions (institutional reform) and
the democratisation of political society (the politics of influence and inclusion),
which would open these institutions to the new identities and egalitarian norms
articulated on the terrain of civil society, are the means to securing this goal"
(526).
While this programme would seem to correspond with Habermas' theory of
communicative action, he is nonetheless faulted for seeing the new social
movements as basically reactive, as "tendentially antimodern communalist
projects of dedifferentiation and withdrawal", as involving "only an
anti-institutional, cultural polities". This view would be correct ifthe politics of
identity were the primar characteristic of the new social movements, but this
would be to commt oneself to an opposite one-sidedness to that of the
proponents of the RM -approach. Be that as it may, this dissension would seem
again to raise the question of what is new about the new social movements,
bearing in mind that identities by definition have to be particular, if not
immutable. Cohen and Arato argue that it is the "emphatic thematisation" of the
dualism that puts the new in new socIal movements, one effect of which
appears to be that a movement ceases to be a movement once it crosses the
boundaries of system and lifeworld and thereby replicate the organisational
structures of its adversaries, following the stage model propounded by Claus
Ofte (1990) among others. In this setting, organisational maintenance becomes
an end in itself whereas in ei vil society it does not. Even though this dualism is
emphatically thematised, it does appear that too a strong an emphasis on the
politics of inclusion would seem to obliterate the rationale of the new social
movements. Remaining then is the mix of identity and influence politics, and it
is a moot choice which one wil predollnate at any particular time. However, it
can be argued that influence without inc1usion is ineffectual so that a
movement that limits itself to influence would need to seek alliances inside
political society to secure legislative approval for its objectives. Even if
legislation is indeed adopted, there may be limits to what legislation may
achieve in view of the autonomous operations of functional systems and other
highly organised sectors of society"
Moreover, the potential for regression cannot be ruled out. As Habermas has
. observed with reference to Cohen and Arato's work: "Erstens kann sich eine
vitale Bürgergesellschaft nur in Kontext einer freiheitlichen politischen Kultur
und entsprechender Sozialisationsmuster sowie auf der Basis einer
unversehrten Privatsphäre herausbIlden - sie kann sich nur in einer schon
rationalisierten Lebenswelt entfalten. Sonst entstehen populistische
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Bewegungen, die die verhärteten Traditionsbestände einer von kapitalistischen
Modernisierung gefährdeten Lebenswelt blind verteidigen. Diese sind in den
Formen ihrer Mobilisierung ebenso modern wie in ihren Zielsetzungen
antidemokratisch" (Habermas 1992: 449). In other words, civil society can be
colonised from within resulting in both regression and anti-democratisation. A
politics of identity may not only mean withdrawal to sectarian autonomy, it
may also be outwardly exclusionary, thus crowding out other actors and groups
within civil society. This possibility is as far as we can see not adequately
acknowledged by Cohen and Arato who tend to think of the politics of identity
as primarily inwardly directed and not outwardly in the sense of the imposition
of categorical identities to the exlusion of others.
As we saw with the cognitive approach of Eyerman and J amison, Cohen and
Arato assume an underlying theory of modernisation and progression which
open up room for the definition of new identities as happened in the context of
the new social movements from the 60's onwards. They also accept the theory
of functional differentiation that give the new social movements its
self-limiting role in the sense that they do not aim at comprehensive
institutional reform. Jf that was indeed their aim they would cease to be social
movements per se and enter the terrain of political society as interest groups or
political parties. Jf institutional reform is outside the orbit of the new social
movements, it would seem their core feature is tied up with notions of identity.
As identities are particular, a strong emphasis on identity formation would
seem to produce paricularist polities, as Habermas argued. This conclllsion is,
however, contingent upon the acceptance of the system-lifeworld dichotomy as
developed by, inter alia, Parsons, Luhmann and Habermas. And, as Calhoun
(1993a) has pointed out, Cohen and Arato's reading of civIl society is selective,
overlooking the tradition of the Scottish moralists (Ferguson, Smith) who saw
civil society as encompassing all non-state capacities for socia! organisation,
inc1uding private economic enterprise. The French tradition of Montesquieu,
Rousseau and Toquevile all stressed the political aspects of civil society and
the capacities of autonomous actors to enter into social relations and social
networks in order to form intermediate associations and mediating institutions.
Both these traditions underline the inc1usionary aspects of civil society and the
creation and modification of social institutions and both traditions do not
operate with notions of system integration so common to newer sociological
theory, including the collective behaviour approach. In that respect they may be
c10ser to the resource mobilsation approach.
Despite their self-imposed restrictions, Cohen and Arato have given us some
concepts to build further upon. These are the concepts of the politics of identity
and the politics of inclusion. To that we now turn.
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4 The politics of identity and inclusion
4.1 Identity formation and citizenship
As we have said above, identities are particular; they distinguish an individual
or collectivity from another individual or collectivity. Identities are moreover
multiple; the authors of this paper may have shared racial (white) and national
(Norwegian) identities, but not a shared gender identity. Thirdly, identities may
be innate or socially constructed or there may be mixes where one feature
predominates. While racial and gender are innate, they are never entirely so as
they tend to be socially reinforced. On the other hand, national identies are
c1early socially construeted, though history abounds with examples of attempts
to give national identities innate status. Though the concern with identities
appear to be universal in the modern age, identities are not as they are
constituted by the notion of difference. In this section, we wil look at identity
formation in connection with citizenship and the role of citizens. As we wil
argue, citizenship belongs under the rubric of the politics of inc1usion,
independently of whether citizenship is defined as the legal status of
membership in a political community or as virtuous activity in the sense of
participating fully in the affairs of the political community. This is so because
citizenship confers upon inviduals the opportunity to participate in national
affairs whether or not citizens make use of this opportunity or not. Nobody
would seriously propose that cItizenship should be remuved from those who,
say, do not vote in national or local elections, even though voting in often
voiced in terms of a duty of citizens rather than a right, the important
distinction bein g that a right is not lost by choosing not to act up on it.
A more interesting question would be whether citizenship also constitutes
an identity of a paricular inc1usionary kind. However, this c1aim has been
disputed by, among cultural pluralists, who argue that members of certain
groups should be incorporated into the political community not only as
individuals, but also as members of particular groups, and that their rights
should also reflect their status as group members. This notion of "differentiated
citizenship"would appear to fly -in theface-ofthose who consider citizenship a
matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This
notion, propounded by Iris Martin Y oung (1989), is argued as follows, "In a
society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting
that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiiations and
experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce the
privilege; for the perspective and interests of the privileged wil tend to
dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups "
(257). She gives two reasons for why equality requires affirming rather than
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ignoring group differences. For one, culturally exc1uded groups are at a
disadvantage in the political system, a situation to be remedied by providing
"institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representation of
oppressed groups" (259). Secondly, excluded groups have distinctive needs that
can only be met through policies that are sensitive to group differences. The
criterion for inc1usion into the special consideration-category is that of
oppression. In our words, the politics of identity plus the politics of inc1usion
equals the politics of difference, Y oung's own term for justifiable policies
adequate to the context of contemporar multi-cultural society.
This complex relationship between citizenship, identity and differenee is a
distinctive feature of modernity. While the pre-modern period recognised
difference as differences in social standing and status, the modern period is
indeed characterised by the recognition of difference as a necessary component
in the politics of inclusion (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, Kymlicka 1995). The
common complaint against liberalism is that liberal theory operates with a
concept of equality that does not accept special considerations for groups, and
that the liberal state should be neutral in matters of identity (as for example the
American state in questions of religious denominations). However, liberals
have countered that the criteria for inclusion as disadvantaged are ultimately
indeterminate. Indeed, in the current US context, the only truly
non-disadvantaged group may be said to be the relatively affluent, relatively
young, heterosexual males, thus possibly inducing them to claim special
consideration as a minority in their own right. One possible consequence of the
politics of differenee may be that in the scramble for special considerations, the
wider purpose of citizenship to forge a common identity is left aside, as
Schlesinger (1992) observes of current trends in American society. Another
consequence may be, as we have hinted to in the case of white males, that every
group would strategically position themselves so as to c1aim minority or
disadvantaged status. Of course, the further subdivisions of identities proceed,
the less likely it is that any identity can c1aim majority status.
A key word in this context is recognition, as identities are never claimed
without seeking recognition for these identities from the wider community
(Calhoun 1994: 20ff.. The absence of such recognition has advers e effects on
self-recognition. Identity politics are political because they involve struggles
seeking not only recognition, but also on occasion power and the target is most
frequently, as we saw above, not civil society, but organisations outside, in
particular the state. Identity politics have also to do with refusing or rejecting
identities imposed or fixed from others on the outside. Consequently and
inspired by deconstructionist approaches, identity claims have been criticised as
being repressive per se. The new social movements are an example of an
attempt to escape from socIal conformity in their emphases on liberation and
lifestyles. But, as we have observed above, there is a tendency to use as the
principle of selection "nice", vaguely leftst movements, forgetting that identity
politics has as much to do with religious fundamentalism, ethnic resentment
towards strangers, nationalism and similar "less nice" collective phenomena
(Merk! and Weinberg 1993; Juergensmeyer 1993).
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New social rnovements can be faulted for drawing too sharp boundaries
between individual self-fulfilment and the demands of society, thus
encouraging what Charles Taylor (1992a: 17ff., 1992b) calls a kind of "soft
relativism", meaning that all identity claims to recognition have the same
standing without further judgement. This would have the perhaps unintended
effect of strengthening individualism and subtituting tolerance for mutual
respect and acceptance. Emphasis on the aspect of choice (of lifestyle) and
differenee (from other individuals or groups) obscures that c1aims for
recognition, respect and legitimacy would need some form of common
framework on the basis of which different claims can be assessed and judged.
As Calhoun points out (1994: 25f., c1aims for recognition are directed at the
polit Y and at the state, thus engaging with the prevalent norms and values of
those institutions and secondly, c1aims stand a better chance of recognition if
intern al group divisions can be kept to a minimum, for example that the gay
community as a community is not further subdivided by gender and by race,
each c1aiming a unique identity.
While multple, fragmentary identities may be bad for concerted collective
action, the imposition of categorical identities (White 1992) may be as bad for
those individuals belonging to the category. What may be called ih-group
essentialism, I.e. that one singular identity predominates to the detriment of
others, settles the tension between a singular, unitary identity as against divided
and cross-cutting identities in favour of the former and assigns fixity and
settled accomplishment to what is an on-going project. The liberal critique of
in-group essentialism would be that granting recognition to the claims of the
group (external rights) would be to deny the rights of individuals inside the
group to dissension (internal rights). One' set of rights (collective) would, on the
liberal account, be clearly incompatible with another set of rights (individual).
The trade-off is real and unavoidable.
The claims for recognition can be met in various ways. Kymlicka and
Morgan (1994: 372ff. mention special representation rights and multicultural
rights as examples of recognition that would be inc1usionary. Whereas the
former would secure for the concerned groups a place in political society, the
latter would secure similar space for cultural expression in civil society. None
of these special considerations would go against an inc1usionary, integrative
definition of citizenship stressing opportunity to participate in the political
affairs of the country. However, the third example of recognition,
self-government rights, would seem to pose problems for this political
definition of citizenship as these rights would neither be integrative or
inclusionary. As they argue, "whIle both representation and multieultural rights
take the larger political community for granted, demands for self-government
reflect a desire to weaken the bonds with the larger community and, indeed,
question its very nature, authority, and permanence. If democracy is the rule of
the people, group self-determination raises the question of who the "people
really are" (1994: 375). This question raises problems for the idea of a
"differentiated citizenship" as well as for a "common citizenship" less
susceptible to accommodating claims to recognition of difference. As they
rightly observe, agreement on questions of political and social justice along the
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lines suggested by John Rawls did not keep Norway from seceding from
Sweden in 1905 nor may it keep Quebec within the Canadian federation. The
penultmate question for a theory of citizenship is for them, "how can we
construet a common identity in a country where people not only be,long to
separate political communities but also belong in different ways - that is, some
are incorporated as individuals and others through membership in a group?"
(1994: 377). That raises the question of national identity as independent or
contingent up on ethnic identity, a topic to which we now turn.
4.2 Ethnic and national identities
In this section the central question is whether national identity follows from
ethnic identity or whether the former constitutes a type of identity which is
distinetly different from the latter. A great deal of the literature on nations and
nationalism can be grouped according to their standpoint on this question
(Calhoun 1993b). Hobsbawn takes a clear stand when he argues that "the basic
characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its
modernity" (1990:14). Disregarding the tautology of the definition, Hobsbawn
sees nationhood as a phenomenon belonging to modernity and not as a
continuation of an ethnic community strectching back into promordial times.
An indication of its belonging to modernity would be to see it as inherently
linked to the concepts of statehood and popular sovereignty. N ationhood is in
this sense a product of statehood and not the other way around and the modern
concept of citizenship with individual rights centred on the state a natural
outgrowth of this proeess.
Modernization theory buIlt on this idea with its concepts of "state-building"
and "nation-buIlding" as the natural precursors of individual, state-centered
rights. As the emphasis was on incorporation in territorial and cultural terms,
local and ethnic identities were merged or fused into a higher entity. This
aspect is evident from Gellner's stress upon "the crystallzation of new units,
suitable for the conditions now prevailng, though admittedly using as their raw
material the cultural, historie al and other heritances from the pre-nationalist
past" (1983: 49). This is also evident from Haas' explanation, drawing upon
Tönnies's famous distinetion between "gemeinschaft" and "gesellschaft", "as
social life has been transformed by industrialization and social mobilzation
into something resembling a modern Gesellschaft based on interest ca1culation,
the nation and nationalism continue to provide the integrative cement that gives
the appearence of modernity" (1964: 465). In a later review, Haas stresses the
legal-rational aspect of nationalism, "Nationalism is the convergenee of
territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing focI of affiliation, such
as kinship, profession, religion, economic interest, race or even language.
Nationalism is "modern" because it stresses the individual's search for identity
with strangers in an impersonal world, a world no longer animated by corporate
identities...Nation-building, infus ing a sen se of national identity, depends, in
my argument, on the victory of the legal-rational form over its potential
competitors" (1986: 71Of.) A rational society would be one that orders itself on
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the basis of reciprocal exchange relations among its members guided by a
common norm of fairness.
From these strongly functionalist accounts of nationalism and modernity it
can be inferred that as long as nationalism is tinged with ethnicity it is bad for
modernity while its absenee is a good thing. The paradigmatically opposite
cases of this admixture would be Germany as an ilustration of the former and
Franee of the latter. French nationalism is construed according to a founding
myth, in which the political aspects of the founding and the idea of citizenship
is accentuated. In the German case, nationalism grew out of a myth of a
pre-existing ethnic identity and citizenship came to be seen as an outgrowth of
membership of the ethnic group. WhIle immigration and the granting of legal
residency may be as difficult in both countries, it has been easier to obtain
citizenship in Franee than in Germany (Brubaker 1993). As other theorists have
pointed out (Hagtvet and Rokkan 1981: 147), late centre-buIlding within
culturally highly homogenous territories is a historical trajectory shared by
Germany and Italy, both of which succumbed to fascism/nazism in this century
and which sets them apart from other forms of authoritarian regimes (Spain,
Portugal) as well as from those countries which did not succumb to one or the
other brand of authoritarianism. In other words, nations based on ethnical
homogeneity would seem, perhaps paradoxically, to be more volatile entities
than nations founded on the ideas of sovereignty and Enlightenment opposition
to tradition.
The alternative account, stressing ethnic continuity, should not be seen as
presupposing a notion of ethnic homogeneity. As argued by Barth (1969) and
others, ethnic identity formation is more a matter of self-ascription than it is of
"objective" ascription by others. In opposition to the primordialist school,
emphasizing emotional ties to family and kinship, Barth underlines the
instrumental aspects of ethnic identity formation. Social organisation of ethnic
identity does not arise out of shared cultural characteristics; cultural identity is
the product, not the precondition, of the social organisation of ethnic groups.
Barh, by turning primordialism on its head, highlights the instrumental,
situational and adaptative aspects of group formation in that social relevant
factors are more diagnostic for membership than any overt, "objective"
differences generated by other factors, relating to primar group membership.
The ethnic continuity thesis has been argued most strongly in recent
scholarship by Smith (1986, 1991), "modern nations and nationalism have only
extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and
structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals,
but modern "civie" nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicIty or
ethnic sentiments" (1986: 216). To believe otherwise, he goes on to argue, is to
engage in a Western mirage, reality-as-wish. Continuity is not identity; the
crucial moment is the transformation of an ethnie into a nation, but, unlike the
modernists, nations retain an ethnic core after this transformation. This
argument is supported by Connor's concept of "ethnonationalism" (1994). In a
sellnal artic1e, "Nation-building or nation-destroying?", published originally in
1972, Connor attacks a set of assumptions that he argues to have guided or
even dominated American "modernist" scholarship on this topic. These
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assumptions inc1ude, inter alia, confusing the concepts of state and nation,
underestimating the emotional power of ethnic nationalism whIle
overestimating the influence of materialism and rationalism upon human
affairs, assuming that greater contact among groups wil lead to greater
commonality and that assimilation is a uni-directional process. Last, but not
least, there is the tendency to extrapolate from American and First World
experiences to the study of Thirld World countries by advocating these
experiences as models of the future for the non-European countries.
The modernist counter-argument would be that there are at any time more
ethnies about than there are nations and that this must be seen as an indication
of ethnic identity not being a sufficient factor for the rationalist-industrialist
nation-buIlding project. The primordialists would then argue to the contrary
that if the above hypothesis is true, then research should be concentrated on
those specific factors involved in the transformation from ethnies to nations.
Smith suggests that this can be done by tracing "a genealogy of nations"
combining cultural and structural variables (1986: 209-226). In his later work,
he differentiates between the Western conception of national identity, which is
associated with citizenship and an.Eastern (covering East Europe and Asia) in
which national identity is defined by membership in a community of common
descent.
4.3 Categorical and relational identities
These civic and ethnic models of national identity account for the two major
alternatives in the contemporary world. Following Wil Kymlicka, we may call
these models "political membership" and "cultural membership", respectively
(Kymlicka 1989: chs.7-8). What is common to both, is the notion, as we noted
above, of categorical identities. Calhoun (1993b: 230) refers to Ekeh (1990)
who has noted a tendency in socIal antropology to speak of ethnic group instead
of tribe. This would have the effect of substituting a categorical identity for a
relational one, of playing down kin relations in favour of the concept of
individual equivalence. Put differently, holding citizenship would be an
example of a categorical identity as you (normally) can hold only one and
thereby distinguish yourself from those who are not citizens of your country,
but of others, whereas family membership can only be conceived as a relational
identity. Ethnic group membership, as Barth conceives of it, would be another
example of categorical identity as the group is constituted by its borders to
other groups and not by its internal relations (as would a family). Nations are
similarly constituted in the international systems of states as individually
equivalent independent of acreage and population size by the prevailng
international law doctrine of "juridical statehood" (Jackson 1990). It is thus
typical of modernity to apply the idea of individuation to nations as much as to
individuals, viewing both as autonomous and self-determining entities (Bloom
1990). Just as individuals can c1aim self-determination, so do nations at the
risk, however, of begging the question of what the "self" in self-determination
is.
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One of the insights of Anderson is his idea of the nation as a categorical
identity, i.e. as the imagined community, "imagined because the members of
even the smallest nations wil never know most of their fellow-members, meet
them, or even hear of them, yet in their minds of each lives the image of their
communion...it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as
a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1991: 6f.) Inequality and exploitation are
concepts signifying vertical structures, and the absenee of comradeship cutting
across relative positions on these structures. Anderson's evocative metaphor of
the nation as "a sociological organism moving calendrically through
homogeneous, empty time" parallels Giddens' defining feature of modernity as
the emptying of time and space and the disembedding of social relationships.
Anderson devotes considerable attemption to devices of categorisation such as
censuses, maps and museums and to print capitalism as a medium that connects
individuals across time and space.
Both "political" and "cultural" definitions of membership, despite their
differences, stress categorical identies and, according to Calhoun,
"underestimate the importance of the institutions, networks and movements
that knit people together across lines of diversity intern al to nations and states"
(1993a: 388), i.e. the problems of social integration. There is thus a need to join
the discussion of the idea of the nation and the idea of social integration by
joining the concepts of categorical and relational identies to understand the two
senses in which political communities are constituted: "The first is the bounded
nature of all political communities, and the embeddedness of all claims to
constitute a distinet and autonomous political community in relationships of
contraposition to other such communities or claimants. The second is the web
of relationships that constitutes a people (or nation) as a social collectivity
existing independently of common subjection to the rule of a particular state"
(1993a: 390). The sec ond sense of community is of course what we have
discussed above under the rubric of civil society. The link or the join would be
the extent to which there is a space for public discourse and intermediate
associations .
Nationalism would then be malevolent to the the extent it claims national
identity as categorical and fixed and trumps other identities, whether they be
gender, class, or region, and to the extent it monopolises the legitimate sources
of identity. Calhoun finds that one reason why nationalism appears to be a
successor ideology of communism in the post-communist countries .is their
shared feature of suppressing space for the articulation of alternative identities.
To internal conformity can be added the external projection of ressentiment
(Greenfeld 1992). But it need not be the case that nationalism only takes
malevolent forms, and Tamir (1993) has been bold enough to argue how
nationalism can be combined with respect for personal autonomy and cultural
diversity.The point of this discussion has been to show some of the uses of the
concept of identity, its fixity vs. its fluidity. We would like to round up this
section by presenting a figure taken from Tily (1978: 63), based on White,
which captures the basic two dimensions. It may be said that the greatest
invention of social science is the 2 x 2 table and we see no reason to dispute
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that here. We also would agree with Tily's comment that the figure gives "a
powerful distilate of the most insipid wines in the sociological cellar - group
taxonomies" (1978: 62). The important thing for us is that it provides a
heuristic device for identifying types of collective action and social movements
according to the two concepts of identity we have been concerned with. One
dimension is the category: people sharing some particular feature which set
them apart from others, say citizenship in a paricular country. The other
dimension is the network: people linked together by direct or indirect bonds.
These dimensions correspond to categorical identity and relational identity,
respectively. The extent of categorical identity is measured by catness on the y
axis and the extent of relational identity by netness on the x axis. For any social
science analysis both categories and actors are needed, and the combination of
both, i.e. catness and netness, yields catnet or the group. A set of individuals is
a group to the extent it comprises both a category and a network. The degree of
organisation can be measured diagonally on the xy-axis as a function of catness
and netness. High degree of organisation is a function of high catness and high
netness.
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Figure 1: Components of Organisation (Tily 1978: 63(
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Looking at the four combinations of catness and netness we would find the
crowd in the lower left-hand box, characterised by low scores on both
dimensions. The crowd was the typical study object of the collective behaviour
approach, the epitome of non-institutionalised, non-routinised behaviour. In the
lower right-hand box we would find friendship networks or, following the
terminology we have been us ing here, the institutions of cIvil society. They
would typically provide for a high degree of relational identity, but a low
degree of categorical identity. Cohen and Arato's proposal for the
democratisation of civil society would then imply a strengthening of relational
identities. Coming to the upper left-hand box, we find "all Brazilians", or, as
we would say, the "imagined community". Strong on catness, but low on
netness, this would be a defining feature of national identity. In the upper
right-hand box, we find the Printers Union Local, the union studied by Lipset,
Trow and Coleman (1956). The study tested the famous thesis of Robert
Michels (1949) on "the iron law of oligarchy" and found that the union had
both distinct, compellng identities and extensive, absorbing interpersonal
networks. High scores on both dimensions would yield a high degree of
organisation. In this box, we would find the social movement organisations
studied by the proponents of the resource mobilsation approach. The accent
would be on inc1usivenss: how much time, energy and network interaction are
expended and engaged in by group members. To use our terminology, these
groups would typically be located at the interstices of civIl and political society.
This taxonomy can also be applied to international society if we accept the
notion of paralleI personal and national individuation as typical of modernity
(B 100m 1992). In the lower left-hand corner we would find the concept of
"international anarchy" typical of the realist school of international relations.
This school argued that the prime objective of states is to maximize national
interest and security, mainly by militar means. In the lower right-hand box we
would find "international co-ordination" , institutions established for the
purpose of co-ordinating relations among states. The first international
organisations were basically of a co-ordinating, non-collaborative nature,
stressing the netness dimension more than the catness dimension. In the upper
left-hand box we might put "world community" as the imagined community of
the present system of states. Frequent references to the opinion of the world
community or statements that the world community should act on this or that
issue are indicative of the idea of corporeal entity that corresponds to our
definition of categorical identity. Finally, in the upper right-hand corner we
would suggest putting "international organisation" with clear distinetions
between members and non-members and with networks for membership
interactions. Regional organisations like the European Union may be said to
both possess a high categorical identity vis a vis non-members and other
regions of the world as well as a relational identity as a network for the
interaction of member states. However, "the law of oligarchy" applies as much
to international organisations as to national, and the present tensions within the
ED very much reflect the extent to which the EU is heading towards the sort of
corporate, corporeal entity which we fin d representative of categorical identity.
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Taxonomies are not theories; they serve as heuristic devices to outline the
contours of a field for further theoretical exploration as well as empirical
investigation. Our objective has been to do exactly that; to outline the contours
of a field in order to come up with suggestions for research. Some pointers are
given by White, Tily, Calhoun and by Somers and Gibson (1994) with their
concepts of "narrative identity" and "relational setting", drawing upon Mclntyre
(1981) and Taylor (1989). These approaches would stress the processual and
relational aspects of identity at the expense of the categorical aspects. A
narrative identity is defined thus by Somers and Gibson, "while a social identity
or categorical approach presumes internally stable concepts, such that under
normal conditions entities within that category wil act predictably, the
narative identity approach embeds the actor within relationships and stories
that shift over time and space and thus precludes categorical stability in action
(1994: 65). On the other hand, a relational setting is "a pattern of relationships
among institutions, public narratives and social practices. As such it is a
relational matrix, similar to a social network. Identity formation takes shape
within these relational settings of contested but patterned settings among
narratives, people and institutions" (1994: 70). Some social scientists like
Anthony Giddens (1990: 12ff., Charles Tily (1984: 11) and Michael Mann
(1986: 2) have argued for doing away with the concept of society altogether as
it obscures the patterned relationships among individuals, institutions and
social and cultural practices. The basic unit for study would thus not be the
individual in society, but the social relationship, the interaction of two or more
individuals, as Tily notes, referring to Sorokin (1984: 28). The utility of
White's taxonomy would be, inter alia, to turn categorical distinctions
(dichotomies) into empirically distinguishable continua.
For our purposes, we find that these concepts are useful to work with and
investigate further. As our focus is on collective identities and social
movements, these concepts provide tools for analysing collective action
domestically, but also as we have tried to show, internationally. It remains to
draw some conc1usions and to make suggestions for further research. -To that
we now finally turn.
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5 Conclusions and suggestions for further research
Our objective in this review has been to draw up the outlne of a field for
further study, theoretical explorations as well as empirical investigations. The
idea has been to provide the prospective student of collective identities and
social movements with at least the rudiments of a to ol box with which to work.
We started out by delineating some salient features of modernity as a way of
situating social movements within a social and historical context. We then
proceeded to decribe the assumptions of the collective behaviour, resource
mobilisation and new social movements approaches and recounted some of the
criticisms which have been raised against them. In the proeess we devoted
considerable attention to the work of Eyerman and Jamison on c?gnitive
praxises and of Cohen and Arato on civIl society, both recent additions to the
NSM approach. Both were faulted for their selective definition of social
movements which we found to be biased in favour of certain types of
movements whIle overlooking others. Therefore, we continued the search for a
framework that would be sufficiently broad-based and neutral to cover all kinds
of movements. Such a framework was found in the juxtaposition of categorical
and relational/narrative identities which we find to be a tool that is suite d to the
analysis of the multiplicity of identities.
On the basis of the above w would like to sugge st three areas where more
research may be needed. First, we would suggest research on the concept of
differentiated citizenship and the phenomenon of multiculturalism. This is a
topic which is indeed very topical at the moment. In the US, it has given rise to
heated debates about the content of the curriculum in colleges and universities
and about political correctness. Generally speakng, this research project would
be about the relationship between political membership and cultural
membership and the degree to which these should be or not be overlapping. As
noted above, can a country survive with separate political communities and
would the granting of separate cultural membership be the first step towards
separate political membership? Kymlicka and Morgan would answer in the
negative, whIle Safran sees in multiculturalism a concession to the forces of
anti-modernity (1994: 69). As we noted above, there remains a lot ofwork on a
theory of citizenship appropriate to the contemporary age.
Secondly, we would sugge st more work on the concept and theories of
social movements. We have noted that much of the current work is oriented to
progressive, democratie movements. But movements may also be regressive,
anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Theories need to account for both similarities
and differences in recruitment, organisation structure and methods of operation
among the full range of movements, whether progressive or regressive. In-built
biases exc1uding the latter type of movements, even if conceeding good reasons
for doing so, do not add to our general knowledge about social movements.
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Thirdly, more work needs to be done on the emergence and changes of
identities. We have used the concepts of categorical, relational and narrative
identities to gras p some of these facets of identity. Within sociology there is a
thriving field of network studies, and anthropology has similarly analysed
networks as relational identities in studies of kinship. This line of research
seems well suited for local-level studies of the composition of identities and the
saliency of particular identities at points in time, drawing both on social
position and narratively mediated traditions.
These proposals are merely meant to be suggestive. Other threads may be
explored, but the above does point to both theoretical and empirical research
questions needed to be more, fully worked out.
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